On May 14, 2026, at 0015 mountain daylight time, a Beech C90, N249CP, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Lincoln, New Mexico. Both pilots and passengers sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated by Generation Jets under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an air ambulance flight. The airplane and air crew were based at Roswell Air Center (ROW), Roswell, New Mexico, for the purpose of providing unscheduled fixed-wing aeromedical services upon request. The flight was under the operational control of Generations Jets, who operated the airplane and employed the two pilots. The two passengers were flight nurses employed by Trans Aero Medical Services. On May 13, 2026, at 2301, the air crew received notification of a mission to fly from ROW to Sierra Blanca Regional Airport (SRR), Ruidoso, New Mexico, to pick up a patient for transport to Albuquerque, New Mexico. Dark night (0% moon illumination), visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident. GPS jamming activities that encompassed the area around the accident flight were being conducted by the United States military during the time of the flight. The airplane was equipped with Spidertracks flight tracking equipment which reported GPS generated altitude, heading, airspeed, and position for the duration of the accident flight. Additionally, ABS-B data captured portions of the accident flight. The data from both sources were consistent with each other, except the recorded Spidertracks GPS altitude was generally about 600 ft higher than the recorded ADS-B altitudes and there were large gaps in the recorded ADS-B data. See Figure 1 for a flight path depiction and summary of key communications. According to the flight tracking data, the flight departed Roswell Air Center (ROW), Roswell, New Mexico, about 2352. During the departure climb, at 2354:18, the pilot contacted Albuquerque (ZAB) Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and requested an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance to SRR. The flight was subsequently cleared “as filed” to SRR and assigned an altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level (MSL). At 2358:39, ADS-B flight data, which had been recorded at 2-3 second intervals, began recording at about one minute intervals. At 0000:26, the ARTCC controller advised the flight crew that the airplane was at 13,000 ft msl, 1,000 ft above their assigned altitude. The pilot responded that they were correcting their altitude and that the airplane had lost GPS capability. The pilot stated they would need a heading. The ARTCC controller provided an initial heading of 275° toward SRR and asked which approach they intended to fly. The pilot requested the RNAV approach to runway 24 at SRR. At 0001:17 the ARTCC controller telephoned their operations supervisor and requested [the military] to stop jamming. At 0001:46, the ARTCC controller cleared the flight to the REYOK intersection and provided a heading of 350°. The pilot read back the clearance. Shortly thereafter, the airplane turned to a northernly heading that put the airplane on a path to cross the ILS 24 approach course between the initial approach fix (CEVBA) and REYOK fix. During the turn, the pilot requested the ILS approach to SRR due to the loss of GPS navigation capability. The airplane continued a northerly heading for about 20 nautical miles, at a GPS altitude of about 12,600 ft. During this segment of the flight, the ARTCC controller provided services to other air traffic, including three additional aircraft that reported a loss of GPS. One of those aircraft expressed difficulty identifying a directed to ground based navigation aid and required additional assistance from ARTCC. At 0004:43 the ARTCC controller advised the flight crew that they would provide radar vectors utilizing right turns to align the airplane for a straight-in approach over the REYOK intersection “in a couple minutes.” About 0005 the ARTCC operations supervisor contacted [the military] to stop jamming and at 0007:34 ADS-B data recording returned to 2-3 second intervals. At 0008:06, while maintaining the northwest heading and about 31 mi northeast of SRR, the flight crew reported they had “a visual on Ruidoso,” but their radio transmission was stepped on by other radio traffic. The flight crew again reported they “[have] a visual on Ruidoso” at 0008:30 and that they could “go visual.” The ARTCC controller subsequently cleared the flight to SRR, cleared the flight for a visual approach, and informed them they could cancel IFR in the air above 9,000 ft msl or they could cancel their clearance via the flight service station after landing. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance and responded that they would cancel IFR “in just a couple of minutes.” There were no additional radio transmissions received from the flight crew. The airplane then began a left turn southwest toward SRR. The Capitan Mountains, extending to 10,201 ft, were located about 14 miles northeast of SRR between the airplane and the airport. About 0010, the ARTCC operations supervisor informed [the military] that the airplane was on a visual approach and that they could resume jamming. At 0010:27 ADS-B again began collecting data at about one-minute intervals. About the same time, the airplane began descending toward SRR followed by a slight right turn at 0013:26 and 9,820 ft Spidertrack GPS altitude. The airplane continued to descend until about 0014:45 when the airplane climbed from about 9,400 ft Spidertrack GPS altitude until the last Spidertrack data point at 0015:26 recorded the airplane at 9,823 ft Spidertrack GPS altitude, 150 kts groundspeed, and a true heading of 250°. The airplane impacted terrain about 250 ft southwest of the last recorded data point at an elevation of about 9,950 ft, and about 730 ft east and 230 ft below the Capitan Mountains Summit Radio Facility, located at an elevation of about 10,180 ft. A post impact fire occurred that initiated a forest fire. Figure 1: Flight Path with Key Communications Foreflight Weather Briefing Review of the Foreflight Briefing and Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) Information that was provided to the flight crew revealed that it contained the following NOTAMs, which were active at the time of the accident. Destination (SRR) “SRR 05/010 SRR SVC AUTOMATED WX BCST SYSTEM U/S 2605132257-2608132300 SRR 05/009 SRR SVC AUTOMATED WX BCST SYSTEM U/S 2605132256-2606182359EST” Enroute Navigation (ZAB) “GPS 05/018 ZAB NAV GPS (WSMRNM GPS 26-13)(INCLUDING WAAS, GBAS, AND ADS-B) MAY NOT BE AVBL WI A 366NM RADIUS CENTERED AT 333638N1063320W(TCS048041) FL400-UNL, 326NM RADIUS AT FL250, 240NM RADIUS AT 10000FT, 240NM RADIUS AT 4000FT AGL, 210NM RADIUS AT 50FT AGL. DLY 0300-0629 2605130300-2605140629” The NOTAMs informed pilots that the SRR automated weather observation system (AWOS) was out of service and that military GPS jamming was scheduled at the time of the accident flight that encompassed the area and altitudes of the accident flight. The Foreflight weather briefing stated “No METAR (Meteorological Aerodrome Report)” and “No TAF (Terminal Aerodrome Forecast)” for SRR. Destination Airport SRR is serviced by two instrument approaches, the ILS or LOC RWY 24 and the RNAV (GPS) RWY 24. Both instrument approach plate notes section contain the following statement: “When local altimeter setting not received, procedure NA (Not Authorized).”