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North Canton, OH
The pilot receiving instruction and the flight instructor had planned a flight to perform practice instrument approaches at two nearby airports, and due to the wind conditions, the flight instructor had planned that the approaches would terminate as low approaches before returning to the departure airport to land. The flight instructor reported that while taxiing onto the runway for departure, he felt the wind push the airplane, which began to skid. While being pushed in the skid, the left main landing gear was lifted and the right wing impacted the ground resulting in substantial damage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A review of surface weather observations for around the time of the accident showed that the wind velocity was about 31 knots, with gusts up to 48 knots. While on the taxiway, the airplane would have been experiencing a direct right crosswind changing to a right quartering headwind as the airplane turned onto the runway. The crosswind gusts the airplane likely experienced were more than twice the maximum demonstrated crosswind component of 20 knots listed in the airplane’s Pilot Operating Handbook. When asked how the accident could have been prevented, the flight instructor stated that the operator should implement maximum wind gust speeds for training flights. Had such limitations been in place at the time of the accident, it is possible that they would have aided the flight instructor in detecting the hazard those extreme wind conditions represented.
The flight instructor’s decision to conduct a training flight in strong, gusting crosswinds, which resulted in the airplane’s right wing impacting the ground during taxi.
The pilot receiving instruction and the flight instructor had planned a flight to perform practice instrument approaches at two nearby airports, and due to the wind conditions, the flight instructor had planned that the approaches would terminate as low approaches before returning to the departure airport to land. The flight instructor reported that while taxiing onto the runway for departure, he felt the wind push the airplane, which began to skid. While being pushed in the skid, the left main landing gear was lifted and the right wing impacted the ground resulting in substantial damage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A review of surface weather observations for around the time of the accident showed that the wind velocity was about 31 knots, with gusts up to 48 knots. While on the taxiway, the airplane would have been experiencing a direct right crosswind changing to a right quartering headwind as the airplane turned onto the runway. The crosswind gusts the airplane likely experienced were more than twice the maximum demonstrated crosswind component of 20 knots listed in the airplane’s Pilot Operating Handbook. When asked how the accident could have been prevented, the flight instructor stated that the operator should implement maximum wind gust speeds for training flights. Had such limitations been in place at the time of the accident, it is possible that they would have aided the flight instructor in detecting the hazard those extreme wind conditions represented.