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Miami, FL
The second-in-command (SIC) pilot of the business jet stated that, when beginning to taxi from parking, they felt a “bump”, so he exited the airplane and checked the area around the nose wheel. With no damage noted, he re-entered the airplane and the crew continued to taxi to the active runway for departure. Short of the runway, the SIC stated that he wanted to perform another visual inspection of the airplane prior to departing. Air traffic control granted permission to the flight crew and the SIC performed a visual examination of the airplane, starting at the nose landing gear. He stated that he then did a “standard clockwise” inspection around the airplane, but he did not notice anything out of the ordinary and he proceeded back into the airplane, after which the flight departed. The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported that about 1 hour into cruise flight, he felt something similar to “light turbulence” that escalated into a significant “buffet”. The PIC instructed the SIC to reduce speed and the autopilot was disengaged. Shortly after, the PIC recalled seeing yellow crew alerting system messages regarding nose pitch, which subsequently cleared, briefly reappeared, before clearing for the remainder of the flight. After additional buffeting and concern for a potential trim malfunction, the crew elected to divert the flight to a nearby airport. The diversion, landing, and taxi to parking were uneventful and no additional vibrations or controllability problems occurred. Once parked, the flight crew performed an external walkaround inspection of the airplane and noted that the right elevator was partially detached at the outboard hinge and was bent down by about 30°. A review of security camera footage from the fixed based operator (FBO) at the departure airport showed that the airplane had contacted a jet blast fence, in the vicinity of the right elevator and horizontal stabilizer, while the flight crew were taxiing from parking. Photographs and measurements obtained from the FBO depicted white paint transfer marks on the fence at a height that was consistent with the accident’s airplane’s elevator.
The flight crew’s failure to maintain adequate clearance from the blast fence during taxi to the runway for departure, and their inadequate inspection of the airplane after it contacted the blast fence.
The second-in-command (SIC) pilot of the business jet stated that, when beginning to taxi from parking, they felt a “bump”, so he exited the airplane and checked the area around the nose wheel. With no damage noted, he re-entered the airplane and the crew continued to taxi to the active runway for departure. Short of the runway, the SIC stated that he wanted to perform another visual inspection of the airplane prior to departing. Air traffic control granted permission to the flight crew and the SIC performed a visual examination of the airplane, starting at the nose landing gear. He stated that he then did a “standard clockwise” inspection around the airplane, but he did not notice anything out of the ordinary and he proceeded back into the airplane, after which the flight departed. The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported that about 1 hour into cruise flight, he felt something similar to “light turbulence” that escalated into a significant “buffet”. The PIC instructed the SIC to reduce speed and the autopilot was disengaged. Shortly after, the PIC recalled seeing yellow crew alerting system messages regarding nose pitch, which subsequently cleared, briefly reappeared, before clearing for the remainder of the flight. After additional buffeting and concern for a potential trim malfunction, the crew elected to divert the flight to a nearby airport. The diversion, landing, and taxi to parking were uneventful and no additional vibrations or controllability problems occurred. Once parked, the flight crew performed an external walkaround inspection of the airplane and noted that the right elevator was partially detached at the outboard hinge and was bent down by about 30°. A review of security camera footage from the fixed based operator (FBO) at the departure airport showed that the airplane had contacted a jet blast fence, in the vicinity of the right elevator and horizontal stabilizer, while the flight crew were taxiing from parking. Photographs and measurements obtained from the FBO depicted white paint transfer marks on the fence at a height that was consistent with the accident’s airplane’s elevator.