Premium research interface

The modern interface for aviation safety intelligence.

Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.

63k+
Reports indexed
1940-2026
Coverage
Recent
Last data refresh
Featured Report

Loading…

Loading featured report…

Loading…
Open Report

Safety trends by operating rule

Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.

Loading trend charts…

Browse the aviation graph

Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.

Last Data Update

By Decade

By Month

Aircraft Manufacturer

More manufacturers

Airports

More airports

Operators

More operators

About

Aviation safety reports, made easier to study

NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.

The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.

The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.

FAQs

NTSB Report

August 27, 2025 · Bell Helicopter Textron Canada 505 NO Series · N505GR

Fort Worth, TX

Overview

Report Status
Probable Cause
Event Type
Accident
Date
August 27, 2025
Injury Outcomes
No injuries (2 uninjured)
Location
Fort Worth, TX
Aircraft
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada 505 NO Series (2017)
Tail Number
N505GR
Operator
Bell Training Academy
Injuries
None
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
NTSB Number
CEN25LA381

The purpose of the flight with the manufacturer flight training academy was for a flight instructor to provide instruction to another flight instructor, who was a customer. About one hour into the flight at the manufacturer’s private flight training heliport, the manufacturer flight instructor was demonstrating a hover out of ground effect (HOGE) autorotation from a straight-in approach with termination on the lane. This was the first HOGE autorotation for the manufacturer flight instructor of the day. At the time of the maneuver, the manufacturer flight instructor reported the wind direction was variable, and the wind speed was light and variable with no gusting. He reported that he was late entering the HOGE autorotation due to a heliport traffic pattern restriction for noise abatement purposes. Near the end of the HOGE autorotation, with about 35 kts airspeed, he performed a small flare by pulling the nose up slightly. About 45 ft agl, he noticed the descent rate accelerated, requiring him to make a small input with the collective. He further noticed that the descent rate became excessive. About 20 ft agl he began pulling the collective to the top stop and he leveled the skids. The helicopter landed hard on the dry asphalt lane, the skids partially collapsed, and the helicopter came to rest upright on the right side of the lane with little forward motion. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the underside of the fuselage. The manufacturer flight instructor reported there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or the engine that would have precluded normal operation. The manufacturer flight training academy reported that the accident was a mismanagement of the flight controls, and the manufacturer flight instructor should have identified the situation the helicopter was in sooner and executed a power recovery to arrest the descent rate. Postaccident investigation revealed that the manufacturer flight instructor, who had been employed with the manufacturer flight training academy for nine years, did not complete the required flight risk assessment tool before the instructional flight. The estimated density altitude for the closest meteorological reporting station was 2,484 ft.

NTSB Probable Cause

The manufacturer flight instructor’s failure to maintain proper airspeed and a proper descent rate during a demonstrated hover out of ground effect (HOGE) autorotation, which resulted in a hard landing. Contributing to the accident was the manufacturer flight instructor’s failure to perform corrective action during the HOGE autorotation with a power recovery in a timely manner.

Full Narrative

The purpose of the flight with the manufacturer flight training academy was for a flight instructor to provide instruction to another flight instructor, who was a customer. About one hour into the flight at the manufacturer’s private flight training heliport, the manufacturer flight instructor was demonstrating a hover out of ground effect (HOGE) autorotation from a straight-in approach with termination on the lane. This was the first HOGE autorotation for the manufacturer flight instructor of the day. At the time of the maneuver, the manufacturer flight instructor reported the wind direction was variable, and the wind speed was light and variable with no gusting. He reported that he was late entering the HOGE autorotation due to a heliport traffic pattern restriction for noise abatement purposes. Near the end of the HOGE autorotation, with about 35 kts airspeed, he performed a small flare by pulling the nose up slightly. About 45 ft agl, he noticed the descent rate accelerated, requiring him to make a small input with the collective. He further noticed that the descent rate became excessive. About 20 ft agl he began pulling the collective to the top stop and he leveled the skids. The helicopter landed hard on the dry asphalt lane, the skids partially collapsed, and the helicopter came to rest upright on the right side of the lane with little forward motion. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the underside of the fuselage. The manufacturer flight instructor reported there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or the engine that would have precluded normal operation. The manufacturer flight training academy reported that the accident was a mismanagement of the flight controls, and the manufacturer flight instructor should have identified the situation the helicopter was in sooner and executed a power recovery to arrest the descent rate. Postaccident investigation revealed that the manufacturer flight instructor, who had been employed with the manufacturer flight training academy for nine years, did not complete the required flight risk assessment tool before the instructional flight. The estimated density altitude for the closest meteorological reporting station was 2,484 ft.

Flight

Event TypeAccident
Event Time13:10 CDT
Nearest AirportBell South Airfield (0nm W)
RunwayLane
Runway Length1600 ft
Runway Width60 ft
Flight Plan FiledNone
Aircraft FireNo
Aircraft ExplosionNo

Aircraft

AircraftBell Helicopter Textron Canada 505 NO Series
Tail NumberN505GR
Aircraft CategoryHeli
DamageSubstantial
OperatorBell Training Academy
Operating RulePart 91
Engines1
Engine TypeTurboshaft
Engine DetailsSafran Helicopter Engines · Arrius 2R · Turboshaft · 505
Seats5

People & Injuries

Injury SummaryNo injuries (2 uninjured)
Fatal0
Serious0
Minor0
Uninjured2
Total2
Crew 1Age 52 · Second Class · None
Crew 2Age 57 · Second Class · None

Conditions

ConditionsVMC
LightDaylight
Wind110° @ 5 kt
Visibility10 sm
CeilingBroken clouds 3300 ft
Temperature / Dew Point68 F
Altimeter30.15 inHg
Observation Time12:55
Weather SourceWFAC

Appendix: Source Data