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Caro, MI
On September 30, 2024, about 1630 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32-300 airplane, N31407, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Caro, Michigan. The pilot was uninjured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 maintenance flight. According to the pilot, the airplane had just completed a two-year maintenance event to Inspect, Repair as Necessary (IRAN) the Lycoming IO-540-K1G5 reciprocating engine. During the IRAN, the engine crankcase was repaired due to a bearing failure, magnetos overhauled, and the fuel injection servo was replaced twice. On the day of the accident, the pilot’s mechanic had informed him that he needed to complete about five hours of flight time so the mechanic could inspect and fix any maintenance issues. The pilot stated that the takeoff and climb into the downwind leg was normal and that he was going to complete a traffic pattern back to Runway 6. During the downwind leg before reducing engine power to near idle and starting a descent, he noticed that the fuel flow indicator reading had dropped from 18 to 14 gallons-per-hour. The pilot stated there were no further abnormal indications from the engine until he tried to increase engine power on an extended two-mile final approach to runway 6. The engine did not respond to engine throttle control movements and the airplane subsequently had a complete loss of engine power. The pilot realized that he would not make the runway due to the distance and performed a forced off field landing. During the forced landing, the pilot dove the airplane to gain airspeed to clear a tree line on the approach end of runway 6. The pilot stated that he held the airplane at the stall horn to clear the trees and hit the ground hard. The airplane bounced, the left main landing gear separated, and the airplane impacted the ground a second time a few hundred feet later. The airplane then slid and came to rest in a ditch abeam the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right horizontal stabilizer and both wings. The wreckage was retained for further examination.
A total loss of engine power due to maintenance personnel’s failure to properly tighten the fuel supply line B-nut at the fuel servo.
On September 30, 2024, about 1230 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32-300 airplane, N31407, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Caro, Michigan. The pilot was uninjured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 test flight. According to the pilot, the airplane had undergone maintenance over the previous two years, during which the engine was overhauled. Upon completion of the maintenance, the mechanic asked the pilot to fly the airplane for 5 hours in the local area; he would then remove the cowling and reinspect the engine. On the day of the accident, the pilot performed an extensive preflight inspection and added fuel to the tip tanks and the right main fuel tank. He taxied to the end of the runway and performed a run-up inspection. According to the pilot, one of the magnetos had an “overly extensive drop in RPMs.” He added power, leaned the fuel mixture, and ran the engine for about 2 minutes. The pilot then performed another magneto check that indicated no anomalies. He turned the fuel pump on, selected the right main fuel tank, and taxied onto the runway. The takeoff was normal, and the pilot continued on the crosswind and downwind legs of the traffic pattern. As the pilot reduced the throttle on the downwind leg, he noticed the fuel flow decreased from 18 gph to about 15 gph. He continued onto the base leg and then, on final approach, he increased the throttle and the engine did not respond. The pilot applied full power with no response from the engine and then pitched the airplane for the best glide speed (87 knots). The airplane cleared the trees at the end of the runway and then remained “just above stall” until it impacted the grass about 200 yards short of the runway. The left main landing gear separated, and the airplane veered to the left coming to rest in a ditch. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right horizontal stabilizer and both wings. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the presence of fuel in both main fuel tanks and the left auxiliary tank; it was blue in color and had an odor similar to 100LL aviation fuel. The right auxiliary tank ruptured during the accident sequence. Fuel was drained from the fuel strainer, and a small amount of black contamination was observed. Examination of the engine revealed that the No. 1 upper spark plug and the No. 3 lower spark plug were finger tight. Additionally, the No. 4 fuel injector nozzle was finger tight in the cylinder. When the electric fuel pump was turned on, no fuel flowed from the injectors and a fuel leak was observed at the fuel servo. The fuel pump was shut off and the B-nut on the line from the fuel servo to the flow divider was found to be loose at the fuel servo fitting. The B-nut was tightened (between 1 and 1.5 turns), and the fuel pump was turned back on. No leak was observed and fuel flowed evenly from all six injector nozzles. A compression check was performed on the engine. As the propeller was rotated by hand, air leakage was noted on cylinder Nos. 1, 4, 5, and 6. All six cylinders were inspected with a borescope; all showed crackling in chrome plating. The valve seats on cylinder Nos. 1, 4, 5, and 6 showed evidence consistent with leakage. A dipstick check of the oil confirmed 10 quarts of oil in the engine; a sample was drained from the sump drain valve with no contaminants observed. The oil filter was removed and cut open; contaminants were observed in the filter pleats. A review of the engine logbook revealed an annual inspection was completed five days before the accident after completion of the repairs. The entry for the inspection specified that the engine crankcase was repaired due to a bearing failure corresponding to the statement from the pilot regarding the two years of maintenance. The entry further stated that new main bearings, a gasket set, and new ball bearings were installed; the fuel servo was also “exchanged” from the manufacturer. According to the entry, the engine was run on the ground for 15 minutes, checked for leaks, and run for another 15 minutes. No anomalies were noted in the logbook entry.